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The purpose of this letter is to provide the NRC with additional information regarding the risk of 
accidents  at  the  Private  Fuel  Storage  Facility  (PFSF)  involving  cruise  missiles.  The  NRC 
requested the additional  information  associated  with cruise  missile testing on the Utah Test and 
Training  Range  (UTTR)  in  a  teleconference  between  personnel  from  the  NRC,  the  CNWRA, 
Private Fuel  Storage, and Stone & Webster that took place on January  17, 2001.  Enclosed with 
this  letter  is a report  entitled "Risk  Assessment  of Cruise  Missile  Accidents  Impacting  Private 
Fuel  Storage  LLC  Independent  Spent Fuel Storage  Installation,"  Revision  1, January  25,  2001 
which  contains the  additional  information  requested by the NRC.  The Report  concludes  that a 
cruise missile striking the PFSF is not a credible event.  
The revisions to the enclosed Report  from Revision 0 of the Report  (as  filed in conjunction with 
Applicant's  Motion  for  Summary  Disposition  of Utah Contention  K and  Confederated  Tribes 
Contention B on December 30, 2000) are identified by a bar in the right hand margin.  
The  NRC's  questions  from  the  January  17,  2001  teleconference  and  the  information  in  the 
enclosed Report responding to the NRC's questions are summarized below.  
NRC Question 1: 
Is the drogue chute, discussed in conjunction with the FTS for the ALCM, considered  part of the 
FTS per se (specifically, is it included in the overall reliability requirement that says that the FTS 
must be 99.9% reliable)?  Do the FTSs for all cruise missiles use parachutes?January 25,  2001
U.S. NRC
PFS Response: 
As discussed  on page  29 of the enclosed  Report,  all FTSs used on cruise  missiles are  designed 
and  built  to  common  performance  specifications,  with  identical  reliability  and  certification 
requirements.  Specifically,  all FTSs  must be  99.9  percent  reliable  at  a  95  percent  confidence 
level.  The designs of FTSs on different models of cruise missile may vary (e.g., ALCM employs 
a parachute as an integral part of its FTS, while Tomahawk  and ACM do not), but all FTSs must 
meet the same performance  standards.  Thus, the drogue chute used with the FTS for the ALCM 
is part of the FTS and it is included in the overall reliability  requirement that  an FTS be  99.9% 
reliable.  
NRC Question 2: 
A 50-knot wind is assumed in Figure  16A of Revision 0 of the Report  (p. 33).  Is a wind assumed 
in Figure  166B?  The figure itself says it does not assume a wind.  
PFS Response: 
The enclosed  Report  (p. 33)  has been  revised  to clarify  that only the  distances in  Figure  16  A 
(which  depict the  impact footprints for the two extremes  of vehicle  weight,  launch weight  and 
empty  weight)  conservatively  assume  a  50-knot  wind  blowing  in  the  most  disadvantageous 
direction.  Figure  16 B (which only depicts trajectory  profile and not impact footprints) does not 
include wind.  
NRC Question  3: 
How does the FTS on the ACM compare with the FTS on the Tomahawk and the ALCM (in 
design and performance)? 
PFS Response: 
See response  to  the first  question  above.  In  addition, the  enclosed Report  as revised  notes  on 
page  33  (note 28)  that because the FTSs on the Tomahawk,  ALCM,  and  ACM are  designed  to 
common  performance  specifications,  they  all  exhibit  similar performance;  and  information  is 
provided with respect to the missile impact area for the Tomahawk missile.  
NRC Question 4: 
The Report (Revision 0) talks about "failures" that occurred during cruise missile tests on the 
UTTR.  What is a test failure in the sense used in the Report?  Is it a crash or is it some other 
malfunction that might not lead to a crash?
2U.S. NRC  3  January 25, 2001 
PFS Response: 
The  enclosed  Report  (p.  32)  has been  revised  to  clarify  that,  as  used  in  the  Report,  the term 
"failure"  is  synonymous  with the  term  "crash,"  which  is  defined  as  "a  missile  impacting  the 
ground at an unintended point." 
NRC Question  5: 
Figure 9 in the Report (Revision 0) is described as "the military low-level route structure 
associated with UTTR" on page  12, but on page  15 it is labeled as "FLIP Military Route 
Planning Chart."  Are both of these correct? 
PFS Response: 
Both are correct; FLIP is an acronym for Department of Defense  "Flight Information 
Publication."  The title to Figure  9 in the enclosed Report (p.  15) has been revised to clarify that 
it reflects the "Military  Low-Level Route Structure Associated with UTTR." 
NRC Question 6: 
On page 32 of the Report (Revision 0), its states that all of the cruise missile crashes in the past 
10 years have occurred  on or within half a mile of the planned route, but page 33 and Figures 
16A and B show that a missile could impact the ground more than half a mile down range of the 
point at which the FTS is activated.  Is the half mile actually a lateral distance? 
PFS Response: 
The half mile referred  to is the lateral  distance from  planned path of the missile.  The enclosed 
Report  has  been  revised  at  page  32  to  clarify  that  the  half mile referred  to there  is  a  lateral 
distance (i.e., perpendicular to the flight path).  
NRC Question 7: 
On page 36 of the Report (Revision 0), it says that "Cruise missile trajectories are tangential (as 
opposed to radial) to the PFSF, with a point of approach no closer than 10 nm [nautical miles] 
from the facility," but Figure  15 on page 27 shows a route that is radial to the PFSF at various 
points.  How do you reconcile those two things? 
PFS Response: 
This sentence  in the enclosed  Report  (p.  36)  has been revised  to  clarify  that  "[a]t  their  closest 
point  of approach to  the PFSF,  cruise  missile  flight  trajectories  are  tangential  (as  opposed  to 
radial) to the PFSF, coming no closer than  10 nm [nautical miles] from the facility."  The points 
on the route shown in Figure  15 at which the trajectory  is radial to the PFSF are to the south and 
west of Michael Army Airfield, more than 15 nautical  miles from the PFSF and well beyond the 
downrange distance that a cruise missile would travel upon activation of the FTS system.January 25, 2001
U.S. NRC
NRC Question 8: 
Figures 7, 8 and 9 to the Report (Revision 0) are difficult to read.  
PFS Response: 
The color prints probably lost quality in the copying process  and we are providing original color 
prints of these Figures  to both the Staff and the Center.  
NRC Question 9: 
Exhibit 4 to the Declaration of George Wagner and David Girman filed in support of Applicant's 
Motion for Summary Disposition of Utah Contention K, December 30, 2000,  is a one page 
summary of "Flight Termination Footprints" for the ALCM with Figure 3.1-4 illustrating the 
impact footprints of the air vehicle and drogue chute for the two extremes of vehicle weight, 
launch weight and empty weight.  Figure 3.1-3 referenced  in the summary was provided as 
Exhibit 16-B to the Report.  Why are the other figures referenced in the summary not provided? 
PFS Response: 
Figure  3.1-4 attached  as Exhibit 4 to the Wagner/Girman  declaration  is the same as Figure  16A 
in the Report.  It was attached  separately to the Wagner/Girman  declaration to draw attention to 
the  figure,  since  it  contains  the  significant  information  on  impact  distances  from  point  of 
activation of the FTS for both vehicle launch weight and empty weight.  Figure 3.1-3  referenced 
in  the  one  page  summary  that  was  included  as  part  of Exhibit  4  to  the  Wagner/Girman 
declaration was also provided in the Report as Figure  16B to illustrate typical trajectory profiles.  
Our experts did not obtain all of the other figures referenced in the summary from the Air Force 
and  they  are  not  necessary  for  the  understanding  of the  missile  impact  footprint  distances 
depicted on Figure 3.1-4 (which are bounding  for the ALCM), and as such are not referenced  or 
included  in the  Report.  In particular,  the  FTS  compartment  cover  discussed  in the  summary 
weighs less than  10 pounds, and thus poses no threat to the PFSF.  
If you have any questions regarding this submittal, please  contact me at 303-741-7009.  
Sincerely, 
John L. Donnell 
Project Director 
Private Fuel Storage L.L.C.
Enclosure
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A  commercially  operated  Independent  Spent  (Nuclear)  Fuel  and  Storage  Installation 
(ISFSI) is being established  in the vicinity of the  Utah Test  and Training Range  (UTTR).  
The land under the proposed  storage is located  on  the Skull Valley  Band of the Goshute 
Reservation.  
The UTTR  is utilized  for testing of Department of Defense  weapons  system, including 
cruise missile,  and there is concern  for the hazard these  missiles may pose to the  ISFSI.  
This report addresses cruise missile testing on UTTR and addresses the risk to the ISFSI.  
Any  risk  assessment  of missile  accidents  impacting  the  proposed  ISFSI,  located  at  40 
24'50"N  and  112  47'37"W,  involves  multiple  aspects  and  many  phases  of  flight 
operations  and  aerial  maneuvers.  This  assessment  examines  cruise  missile  testing 
operations  and activities in the  area to  determine the risk posed by cruise  missile  testing 
to  the  facility.  Missile  operations,  routes  and  procedures  are  carefully  examined  and 
assessed to insure every possible aspect and angle is thoroughly covered.  
Three types of cruise missiles have been flown in test flights on the UTTR:  Air Launched 
Cruise Missile (ALCM,  AGM-86), Tomahawk  (BGM-109), and Advance  Cruise Missile 
(ACM, AGM  -129).  All three are subsonic, autonomous  missiles, which fly carefully pre
programmed  flights  along  designated  routes.  Cruise  missiles  are  normally  launched  at 
altitudes  between  15,000  and  20,000  feet.  Then  they  normally  descend  to  operational 
altitudes  as  determined  in  the  planned  mission  profile.  Nominal  enroute  altitudes  are 
usually below  10,000 feet down to 500 feet  above ground  level.  Physical characteristics 
are: 
ALCM-  AGM-86  Tomahawk BGM-109'  ACM  - AGM - 129 
Length  20'  9"  20'  6"  (with booster)  20'  10" 
Wing Span  12'  0"  8'  9"  10'  2.8" 
Diameter  27 inches  20.4 inches  29.25" 
Weight:  Full  3,200 lbs.  2,300 lbs.  3,300 lbs.  
Mission end  1,500  lbs.  1,500 lbs.  1,500 lbs.  
Warhead:  Diameter  23 inches  20"  24" 
Weight  700 lbs.  1,000 lbs.  700 lbs.  
Engine:  Diameter  14"  12"  14" 
Weight  210 lbs.  150 lbs.  210 lbs.  
Speed  500 knots  450 knots  500 knots 
Range  1,500 NM  1,000 NM  1,800+  NM 
This  risk  assessment  will  be  confined  to  determining  the likelihood  or probability  of a 
missile  accident  impacting  the  proposed  Independent  Spent  (Nuclear)  Fuel  Storage 
' Tomahawk Flight Test Operations  on the West Coast of the United States, page 2.2, Table  2-1
- PAGE  •  4oInstallation  (ISFSI).  Any evaluation  of crash  impact  effects  on the  proposed  facility  is 
beyond the scope of this assessment.  
THE AGM  86 B MISSILE DESCRIPTION (Air Launched Cruise Missile or ALCM) 
The  AGM-86  is  a  first  generation,  subsonic,  turbofan  powered,  winged  missile.  The 
ALCM will deliver a warhead  in an air-to-ground mission with a high degree of accuracy 
at long range.  During captive  carry (see Definitions)  the  missile is hung on  a B-52 wing 
pylon or carried  in an internal bomb bay  on a rotary launcher.  During captive  carry the 
missile's  flight  surfaces  (wings,  fin and  elevon)  and engine  inlet are  carried  in a stowed 
position.  After launch  the missile's  flight control  surfaces  are  deployed  and the  engine 
provides thrust within a few seconds.  Computer controlled navigation directs the missile 
to its target. The  ALCM can carry both nuclear and conventional  payloads  (although it is 
never tested with a nuclear payload).  
Figure 1: Air Launched Cruise Missile Schematic 
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•JTHE TOMAHAWK  BGM-109  MISSILE DESCRIPTION 
The Tomahawk  Cruise  Missile  system was  developed  during  the 70's  to  provide  long
range  standoff  weaponry  to  the  U.S.  Navy.  The  system  reached  its  Initial  Operating 
Capability  (IOC)  in  1984  with  deployment  of the  nuclear  variant  TOMAHAWK  Land 
Attack  Missile  (TLAM/N).  The  Tomahawk  Land  Attack  Missile  with  conventional 
warhead (TLAM/C)  and a sub-munitions  dispense variant (TLAM/D) followed.  TLAM  is 
launched  from  surface  ships  or  submarines  against  land  targets.  The  missile  flies 
autonomously  at subsonic  speed  along a pre-planned  route  for the entire  mission, which 
is  loaded  into  the  missile  as  part  of  the  launch  sequence.  Navigation  accuracy  is 
maintained  through use of digital maps  stored  in the  missile  as  part of the  data load  for 
the particular mission, using on-board  sensors  and a very accurate  inertial measuring  unit 
(IMU),  now  supplemented  by  Global  Positioning  System  (GPS).  Test  flights  of 
Tomahawk  were  flown  to  UTTR  in  the  past,  but  none  within  the  past  decade.  See 
Reference  Q for additional information.  
THE AGM  129 MISILE DESCRIPTION  (Advanced Cruise Missile or ACM) 
The AGM  129 is  a second generation,  subsonic turbofan powered,  winged missile.  It  is 
an improved  version  of the AGM-  86  with improved  stealth,  greater range  and  forward 
swept wings.  The ACM  can  only be carried  on B-52  external pylons.  Other design  and 
mission features are similar to the ALCM.2 
Figure 2:  Advanced Cruise Missile Layout 
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Figure  1.0-1  ACM  General  Arrangement
2 General  Dynamics Convair Division  ACM  Subsystem  Familiarization  Guide Figure  1.0-1  & 
1.0-2.
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UTTR  is part of the Western Range Complex,  shown in the diagram below. 3 
Figure 4: Western Range Layout
The Utah Test and Training Range (UTTR)  is  an Air Combat Command  (ACC)  training 
range  with  infrastructure  to  support  Large  Footprint  Weapons  Testing.  Air  Launched 
Cruise  Missile  (ALCM),  Tomahawk  Land  Attack  Cruise  Missiles  (TLAM),  and 
Advanced  Cruise Missile  (ACM)  are  Large  Footprint Weapons,  all  of which have  been 
and can be flown at UTTR.  
UTTR  is a designated  Major Range Test Facility Base  (MRTFB)  under the Commander, 
388 Fighter Wing  (the 388 RANS), the designated operating agency for the range.  UTTR 
activities  are conducted  in compliance with AFI (Air Force  Instruction)  13-212, Volumes 
1-3  and  supplements.  The  UTTR  is  located  in northwestern  Utah  and  eastern  Nevada.  
The Mission Control Center (MCC) is located off range at  Hill AFB  and is connected via 
microwave/fiber  links.  The  large  flat  expanse  of range  has  an  average  elevation  of 
approximately  4,200  feet  above  sea level.  On  the  North  Range  348,767  acres  are  DoD 
owned,  the South  Range,  including  Dugway  Proving  Ground,  there  are  1,341,27  acres 
(14,595  acres  extend into  Nevada).  Much of the UTTR airspace  is over Bureau  of Land 
Management  (BLM)  land.  Ground  operations  on BLM  land  must be  approved  by BLM 
3 Tomahawk Flight Test Operations on the West Coast of the United States, Fig.  1-1
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Iprior to the program commencement.  Figure  10 shows the geographic  area encompassing 
UTTR.  
RANGE CAPABILITIES 
Key  capabilities  of the  UTTR  used  to  support  cruise  missile  tests  are  optical  tracking, 
radar  tracking,  radio  and  telemetry  relay,  and  ground  stations  capable  of transmitting 
either remote control or flight termination instructions to the missile. All UTTR test areas 
are capable of munitions tracking, data collection  and transfer,  telemetry acquisition  and 
recording,  communications,  mission  control,  and  full data  reduction.  Test  functions  are 
remotely monitored  and operated from the test Mission Control Center at Hill AFB, Utah 
BOUNDARIES 
Airspace  boundaries  do  not  necessarily  coincide  with  the  boundaries  of the  DoD  land 
beneath  this  airspace.  The  UTTR  encompasses  8,125  sq  NM  of  restricted  airspace, 
(approximately the size of the  state of Massachusetts),  which can be  expanded to  17,000 
sq NM  (Massachusetts and Vermont) through adjacent Military Operating Areas (MOAs) 
(in an area 207  by 92 NM).  Land  space is 2,700  sq NM of DoD land  and 14,300  sq NM 
of Bureau  of Land Management,  State of Utah,  and  a  small  amount  of privately  owned 
lands underlying the restricted  air space and MOAs. This includes  the land owned by the 
Skull  Valley  Indian  Reservation.  This  large  airspace  and  ground  space  allow  for  large 
safety  footprints  and  long  trajectory  legs  required  by  Precision  Guided  Munitions 
(PGMs)  and  cruise  missiles.  Major  munitions  test  areas  include:  12  targets  for  testing 
conventional munitions;  four highly instrumented targets used for testing of PGMs, smart 
armament/munitions,  and  home  on  emitter  seeking  missiles;  four cruise  missile  impact 
targets; and five air to surface tactical target complexes.  
CONTROLLED  AIRSPACE REGIONS 
The Airspace  over the  UTTR  consists  of  10 Restricted  Areas  and  8  Military  Operating 
Areas  (MOAs).  Restricted  Areas,4  Military  Operating  Areas  and  Special  Use  Airspace 
are  military  controlled  airspaces  to  conduct  operations  and  test  and  are  defined  on  the 
Definitions page.  
Within  the  UTTR,  Restricted  Areas  and  MOAs  are  as  shown  in  Figures  7-11  with  the 
following altitude limitations:5 
4  AFI  13 - 212 Volume  1 Weapons Ranges  page 25 
5AFT  13 - 212, UTTR Supplement (1) TEST, page 9,  para 2.3
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R6404A 
R6404B 
R6404C 
R6404D 
R6405 
R6406A 
R6406B 
R6407 
R6402A 
R6402B 
Military Operating 
Lucin A 
Lucin B 
Lucin C 
Sevier A 
Sevier B 
Sevier C 
Sevier D 
Gandy
Surface to Flight Lever FL) 580 (58,000 feet) 
Surface to 13,000 Mean  Sea Level (MSL) 
100'  Above Ground Level (AGL) to FL280 
from, but not including, 13,000'  MSL to FL 250 
100'  AGL to FL 580 
Surface to FL 580 
100'  AGL to FL 580 
Surface to FL 580 
Surface to FL 580 
100'  AGL to FL 580 
Areas (MOAs) 
100'  AGL to 9,000'  MSL 
100'  AGL to 7,500'  MSL 
100'  to 6,500'  MSL 
100'  to 14,500'  MSL 
100'  AGL to 9,500'  MSL 
14,500'  MSL to, but not including FL 180 
9,500'  MSL to, but not including FL 180 
100'  AGL to, but not including FL 180
The proposed  storage area is located under Sevier B MOA in the South Range area of the 
UTTR  as  shown  in Figure 5.  It is important  to note  that Sevier B  MOA  is  118 nautical 
miles long from the North  to the South,  and is  38 nautical  miles wide  at its widest point 
from the east to the west.  However, we are only concerned  with the northernmost portion 
of the  MOA,  in  Skull  Valley.  Northern  Sevier  B  MOA  dimensions  are  a  maximum  of 
13nm to  a minimum of 6nm wide from east to west.  
TARGET AREAS LOCATED ON THE UTTR RANGE 
All cruise missile designated  targets, TS-1  through TS-4, are located  on the  South Range, 
as follows:
TS- 1 
TS-2 
TS-3 
TS-4
Latitude 
400 22'  22" 
400 21'  06" 
400 06'  50" 
400 08'  07"
Longitude 
NI 130  06' 
N1130  11' 
NI13 0  34' 
N1130  31'
37" 
38" 
15" 
10"
W 
W 
W 
W
These are shown plotted on Figure 5.
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TACTICAL  PILOTAGE  CHART  0
TS  1 is the  primary  cruise  missile  target,  and  is  located  15  nautical  miles  (17.0  statute 
miles)  west of the proposed storage  facility. TS  2  is  18.2  nautical  miles (20.7  sin)  west, 
TS-3,  37  nautical  miles (42.0 sm) west  and TS-4, 39.1  nautical  miles  (44.4 sm) west, are 
also  authorized for  use as  targets  for Flight  Termination  System  (FTS)  equipped  cruise 
missiles. The TS-1  target is located in restricted  area R-6402A.  TS- 2 target is located in 
R6406A.  TS-3 and  TS-4 targets  are located  in  R-  6407.  Run  in headings for all cruise 
missile tests are established  by individual test requirements  and safety reviews.6 
AIR ACCESS 
Air  traffic  control  is  maintained  in  the  UTTR  range  by  Clover  Control7  (299 f  Range 
Control  Squadron  [RCS]),  Through  a Letter  of Agreement  with  the Salt Lake  Air Route 
Traffic  Control  Center  (ARTCC),  Clover  Control  has  been  delegated  control  of  the 
airspace  that  comprises  the  UTTR.  Clover  Control  has  proprietary  control  over  what 
aircraft  enter,  exit,  and  the  duration  during  which  aircraft  utilize  their  airspace  and 
rangeland.  Range  airspace  access is  strictly  controlled according  to  the range  schedule.  
6  AFR  13-212 UTTR Supplement (1)  TEST, page 20 
'AFI  13  212. UTTR  Supplement (1) TEST. page 9
* PAGE  •  llIFigure  6 below  depicts  the  UTTR  Air  Traffic  Control  Sectors,  Figures  7  and  8 show, 
respectively,  the high  (above  18,000  feet) and  the  low (below  18,000  feet)  civil routes.  
Figure 9 shows the military low-level route structure associated with UTTR.  
Figure 6: UTTR Air Traffic Control Sectors 
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Figure  3.  South Range  High  and  Low  Sectors.
* PAGE  - 12•Figure 7: High Enroute Chart Showing Restricted Airspace
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See Figures  10,  11  & 12 for a scaled in view of the UTTR landmass,  Restricted  Airspace 
and Military  Operating  Area  (MOA)  regions.  These Figures  depict  these  areas  from  an 
- PAGE  •  15-
_Lýoverhead  perspective  from  the  macro  scale  to the  micro  view  of the  proposed  storage 
facility.  The storage site is depicted on each  scaled chart by a star symbol.  
Figure 10: Macro Overhead View of UTTR Airspace
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C(oFigure 11: Intermediate Overhead View of UTTR Airspace 
4CADRO  P  :0
TPC F16C, Edition  11,  Oct 24 1991 
TPC GlB,  Edition 14, May  21  199% 
TPC F16C, Edition  11,  Oct 24 1991
M  Printd Feb 02 2000 14:25:48  PCECHUM downloaded Dec 01  1999 
DAFIF data expires  Feb 23 2000 
ý.CADRG current as of Jun 24  1999
- PAGE  - 17-Figure 12: Micro View Showing Indian Reservation 
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GROUND ACCESS 
Land access is also strictly controlled8 . All personnel who require access to Department  I 
of Defense (DoD) land areas of the UTTR must receive proper authorization before 
'AFH  13  -212. UTTR Supplement  1 (TEST) page 5 paragraph  1.5 Ground Party Requirements
*  PAGE  - 18,entering.  Entry into U.S.  Army (USA) property must be coordinated through the USA at 
Dugway Proving Ground.  
II:  CRUISE MISSILE TEST PLANNING 
PLANNING  PROCESS 
Cruise Missile tests are strictly controlled events, with a comprehensive  planning process 
in  place  that  governs  preparation  for  each  test  operation.  Program  offices,  operating 
commands, and test organizations  have been directed to employ a disciplined test process 
throughout  all  phases  of an  armament/munitions  life cycle.  This  process  applies  to  all 
testing including  developmental,  operational,  and  combined  testing.  Air Force  Manual 
99-104 Armament/Munitions  is a 48-page  source manual,  which details weapons  and the 
cruise missile test process.  This testing is  an iterative process intended to reduce risk9.  
Many regulations  govern  the  conduct of cruise missile  testing.  These include Air Force 
regulations,  Air  Combat  Command  regulations,  Utah  Test  and  Training  Range 
regulations and Aircraft technical  orders.  See References  A, B,  E, F, G and  S.  
The  49  TESTS  Squadron  located  at  Barksdale  Air  Force  Base,  Louisiana  is  the 
responsible test organization  for Air Combat Command's cruise missile testing program.  
United States  Strategic  Command  at Offutt  Air Force Base in Omaha,  Nebraska  and Air 
Combat  Command  at  Langley  Air  Force  Base,  Virginia  has  oversight  of  the  cruise 
missile testing process.  
Planning typically starts many months in advance  of the test, to allow proper preparation 
and safety review  of the test  plan'0 . The methodical  process  includes tasks,  with  specific 
responsibilities assigned,  for a safe and successful test. The steps in the process include: 
"*  Integration of Objective  and Compliance Criteria: 
"*  Integrate  the  proposed test  objectives  to  ensure  a  complete  and  cohesive 
set of test requirements.  
"*  Construct  a  Test  Plan  that  satisfies  all  of the  objectives,  while  ensuring 
that  the  mission  is  safe,  efficient  and  economical.  Safety  is  the  over
riding concern.  
"*  Mission Planning: 
"*  Specify the Software and Testing Objectives 
"*  Specify the Missile Flight Route and Restrictions 
"*  Plan the Mission 
"*  Analyze and Validate the Planned Mission to ensure compliance 
"-  Distribute the Mission Plan for use 
"*  Target Preparation 
9  Air Force Manual  99-104, page 10,  para 2.3.1.2 
10 Tomahawk Test and Evaluation  Directive Number  18A, Tomahawk  Flight Test Planning.
- PAGE  •  19."  Select target and validate its precise location 
"*  Develop mission scoring  rules 
"*  Designate  support system requirements  for monitoring and scoring 
"  Missile Preparations 
"*  Designate  configuration of missile for flight test 
"*  Validate the configuration 
"  Launch Platform Preparations 
"*  Designate the launch platform configuration  for the test 
"*  Develop specific Test Operations Procedure 
"*  Train  and Certify the launch platform and crew 
"  Test Operations and Contingency Planning: 
"*  Detailed Plan of operations for the test 
"*  Development  of actions, procedures,  contingency and emergency plans 
"*  Data collection planning 
"*  Mission Firing Plan: 
"*  Launch Platform procedures 
"*  Countdown timelines 
"*  Go/No  Go decision criteria 
"*  Mission recovery  or termination requirements 
"*  Contingency  plan for anomalous  events 
"*  Contingency  plans and responses 
"*  Data Distribution Plan 
"*  Mission Scoring  Plan 
"*  System Readiness Assessment 
*  Ensure  all test elements  are fully integrated and capable of carrying out the 
test, including firing unit, range and support assets.  
Preparations  for each  and every cruise missile  flight test are intensive  and lengthy. With 
test  missile  and  funding  limitations,  the  plans  are  scrutinized  throughout  their 
development,  with safety always the primary  overriding principle,  to ensure a  successful 
test.  Key items of concern throughout the planning for each test are: 
"*  Achievability  --  Are  sufficient  measurements,  methods,  test  resources,  and 
instrumentation  available? 
"*  Executability  -- Can  the  objectives  be  accomplished  within  program  constraints 
and limitations? 
"*  Safety  --  Can the test be performed safely? 
"*  Utility  --  Do  the  test  objectives  clearly  and  conclusively  evaluate  the  desired 
feature? 
"*  Cost -- Can the customers afford the cost of the objective? 
"*  Schedule -- Is sufficient  time available to accomplish  the objective? 
"*  Environmental  Impacts  -- Can  the  objectives  be  accomplished  without  adverse 
effects  on the environment? 
Two  of these topics  concern  the focus of this risk assessment:  Safety and Environmental 
Impacts.  Test safety  and environmental  concerns  are cornerstone-planning  considerations
- PAGE  - 20.throughout the  test planning  and execution phases  of every test.  They  are present  at the 
genesis  of any and all test concept and planning efforts  and remain forefront through the 
end of the test.
- PAGE  ,  21-III.  CRUISE MISSILE TEST SAFETY REVIEW
Safety and risk reduction initiatives  are built into every aspect and phase of cruise missile 
test operations11. Viability of existing  weapons  inventory is an  essential function  of the 
test  and evaluation  community.  Another  incumbent responsibility  of this  community  is 
the  minimization  of the  inherent  risks  to  both  civilian  and  military  lives  and  property 
associated  with such weapons  testing'2. The  Air Force has  a  responsibility  to protect the 
public  to the maximum  extent  practicable  from  the  hazards  and  effects  associated  with 
flight  operations conducted  on their ranges.  To  this end, a through safety review process 
is in place for weapons testing.  
REVIEW PROCESS 
The  3881h  Range  Squadron  develops  cruise  missile  testing  procedures  that  require 
operational  hazard  analysis  and  formal  safety  reviews  of all  test  programs  as  well  as  •  3 
safety  reviews  of  particular  test  missions 1  . The  safety  review  has  established  the 
following primary  measures to minimize risks: 
"*  Missile preparation 
"*  Aircraft software preparation 
"*  Carrier aircraft preflight inspection 
"*  Missile loading by trained personnel, under supervision, with checklists 
"*  Software and missile fault tests 
"*  Missile ejection  circuitry analysis 
"*  Real time monitoring of launch circuitry by test personnel 
"*  Routes planned  to avoid property and personnel 
"*  Remote Command and Control (RCC) capability  to steer missile 
"*  Flight Termination System (FTS) 
"*  Weather minimums ensure chase aircraft can follow missile 
"*  Advanced Range  Instrumentation  Aircraft  (ARIA) relay  of telemetry data  to Mission 
Control Center (MCC) 
"*  MCC real-time picture for timely safety decisions 
"*  Remote  control  system  and  flight  termination  system  parameters  and  plans  keep 
missiles in safe areas 
"*  Flight  termination  system  components  are  independent  of  missile  normal  control 
mode 
"*  Airborne Range Instrumentation  Aircraft (ARIA): 
"*  Crew member training on RCC/FTS 
"*  ARIA relay of Telemetry Relay  (lets test conductor know if missile  is receiving  FTS 
carrier  signal) 
Air Force Manual 99-104 Armament/Munitions  Test Process, page 7; Figure 2.2 The Air Force 
Test and Evaluation Process 
12 AFI  13-201  Air Force Airspace Management page 26 & 27. Protection of Civilian Population 
and Communities 
AFI  13-212,  UTTR Supplement  1 (TEST) page  14
- PAGE  - 22-"*  Radio relay from Mission Control Center (MCC)  to chase aircraft 
"*  FTS signal monitoring (so  ARIA crew can warn chase or MCC of hazards) 
"*  ARIA transmits of FTS carrier signal 
"*  Weather criteria 
"*  Ensure  chase aircraft can see missile and ground 
"*  Ensure chase aircraft can refuel  from tankers 
"*  Criteria for test execution prevent exceeding these limits 
"*  Four chase aircraft required (3  minimum for go) 
"*  Tanker for refueling  - required for go 
"*  ARIA  aircraft - required for go 
"*  Operational  MCC - required to go 
"*  Ground recovery  team - required for go 
"*  Helicopter for recovery team required for go 
"*  Contingency procedures  to take if elements drop out 
"*  Multiple tracking capabilities to monitor missile flight path at all times 
The organization responsible  for conducting  operational  tests of cruise missiles (4 9 th  Test 
Squadron  at  Barksdale  AFB,  LA)  publishes  detailed  test  instructions  specifying 
additional  safety  criteria,  test  team  membership  and  duties,  and  detailed  checklists.  In 
14 
addition, they maintain a comprehensive  lessons learned  program from earlier tests 
APPROVAL PROCESS 
Prior  to  each  test, the  Range  Control  Officer  convenes  a  Safety  Review  Board  (SRB) 
between  60  and  45  days  before  the  start  of testing.  The  SRB  reviews  the  Operating 
Hazard Analysis  and the approved  test plans provided  in advance to Range Safety 15. The 
customer must be present at the SRB,  and is bound to comply with all  range restrictions 
and the procedures  approved by the SRB.  
The  Range  Test  Director  is  responsible  for  and  is  the  final  decision  making  authority 
during all phases of test conduct and preparation.  He also monitors  mission development 
to  ensure  achievement  of  all  flight  objectives  and  ensures  each  test  team  member  is 
assigned specific responsibilities.  He along with the Range Control Officer convenes  the 
Safety  Review  Board.  Key personnel  are  listed  in  the ACM  Operations  and  Procedures 
Manual16  Additionally he uses  teleconferences  to  conduct  the briefing  schedule as  listed 
in References  A, B,  and C in the aforementioned manual.  
14 AFI  13 - 212 Vol. I Weapons Ranges, Chapter 2, page 14, Ensuring Range Safety 
s AFI  13-212. UTTR Supplement  1 (TEST) page  14, para 3.3 
16 ACM  Operations  Concepts and Procedures page  1 to 2.
•  PAGE  •  23°IV.  CRUISE MISSILE TEST EXECUTION
In preparation for each test, routine meetings  are held shortly  before the execution  of the 
test  to  ensure  that  the  test  can  be  properly  and  safely  conducted..  The  program 
organization responsible for the system reviews  and approves the specifics of the mission 
in  a  Mission  Readiness  Review,  and  the  Range  approves  the  accomplishment  of the 
mission on its range as described in Section III.  
A typical  set  of normal  cruise missile test  procedures  are listed  in  the  Advanced  Cruise 
Missile  (ACM)  Operations  and  Concepts  and  Procedures  manual,  Reference  S.  These 
procedures  optimize  the  launch  aircraft  and  missile  configuration,  meteorological  and 
atmospheric  conditions  and  generally  maximizes  safety  before  the missile  is  launched.  
As part of the pre-launch process,  briefings are  conducted,  mission readiness  is assessed, 
communication,  control  and  telemetry  links  are  checked,  range  weather  is  confirmed, 
safety  concepts  are  reconfirmed,  remote  command  and  flight  termination  system  is 
checked  and  verified,  air  refueling  procedures  are  discussed,  air  and  ground  range 
readiness is confirmed and photo chase requirements  are double checked. 17 
Contingency  operations  are also  heavily reviewed  prior to  any scheduled  cruise  missile 
launch.  Mission  Control  evacuation  plans  are  reviewed.  Hung  weapon  and  weapon 
jettison  procedures  are  discussed.  Loss  of  Advanced  Range  Instrumentation  Aircraft 
(ARIA)  UHF  radio relay,  loss  of Remote  Command  and  Control  (RCC) are  reviewed.  
Loss  of visual  contact  with missile, loss  of chase aircraft,  loss of ARIA,  loss  of tankers, 
and chase aircraft radio loss are studied.  Stem application  of tested and proven checklists 
exists for these and other contingencies.  Strict protocols derived from lessons learned  are 
applied  anytime  deviations  are  noted  before,  during,  and  after  missile  free  flights.  
Rigorous  checklist  disciplines  during  unusual  situations  maximize  range  safety  at  all 
times.  
In planning each  mission, buffer  lines (also known  as termination  lines) define  the areas 
on  ranges  or  along  planned  route  structure  that  the  missile  will  not  be  allowed  to 
penetrate.  At the Utah Range a line 2 nautical miles inside any Warning Area, Restricted 
Area,  or Military Operating  Area  (MOA) boundary  are enforced.  In  our  situation,  no 
missile flights are conducted  in Northern  Sevier B  MOA or in Restricted  Areas R-6406B 
or R-6402B  as  stated by Mr. Don Good  from 49th TESTS  Squadron at Barksdale  AFB, 
LA  Skull Valley  and  the ISFSI  are avoided  by at  least  10 nautical  miles. See  Reference 
U.  
For cruise  missile tests,  given  their  autonomous  nature,  significant  attention  is  given  to 
closely  tracking  the  missile  throughout  its  flight.  Each  missile must  have  an  approved 
Flight  Termination  System (FTS) installed  so that  it can be commanded  to  alter route  or 
to terminate its  flight by a human. While  flying, the missile  is literally tracked by eyeball 
by a pilot in  a chase  airplane  to ensure  that the  missile  is performing  properly  in  flying 
characteristics  as well as route compliance.  
"17  Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM)  Operations Concepts and Procedures  pages 24-28
- PAGE  - 24-Typical  airborne  assets  employed  to  conduct  a  cruise  missile  test  for ALCM  or  ACM 
include: 
"*  One B-52 mothership  with the  cruise  missile loaded  on  either an  external  pylon 
in the  case  of the  Advanced  Cruise Missile  or internally  on  a  rotary  launcher  in 
for the Air Launched Cruise Missile.  
"  One  E-135  Advanced  Range  Instrumentation  Aircraft  (ARIA)  to  control  the 
missile  if  necessary  and  gather  the  telemetry  stream  containing  vital  missile 
parameters 
"  Four to eight F- 16/F- 14 chase aircraft with Remote  Command and Control (RCC) 
pods to manually fly the missile in the event this becomes  necessary.  
"*  Two T-38 photo chase aircraft as mission needs dictate.  
"*  Two KC-10 tankers or four KC-135 tankers to refuel the chase aircraft.  
"*  And finally two to three helicopters  to recover the missile  and control the  missile 
landing area.  
All of these  aircraft  are  operated  under  the  control  of the test  conductor located  at the 
range control facility on the ground, or airborne from the ARIA aircraft'8.  
A  typical  mission,  using  Tomahawk  as  an  example,  is  depicted  in  the  following 
schematic' 
Figure 13:  Typical Navy Enroute Formation During Mission
Relay Aircraft
Telemetry 
Relay
18  Advanced Cruise Missile Operations Concepts and Procedures, page  14a 
"1  Tomahawk Flight Test Operations on the West Coast of the United  States, Fig.  2-7
- PAGE  - 25°In addition to the  aircraft tracking the missile throughout  its  mission, the ground control 
station  monitors  the  missile's  performance  and  key  operation  parameters  through  the 
integrated  telemetry  system  in  the  missile  to  detect  malfunction  or  unexpected  events.  
The  ARIA aircraft  has  the  ability  to  take  control of the  missile  in  flight  and  "manually 
fly"  the  missile  should  override  of  the  pre-planned  mission  be  necessary  due  to  an 
unexpected  airspace  occurrence,  in  coordination  with  range  control.  Both  range control 
and  ARIA  aircraft  have  the ability  to  terminate  a missile's  flight should  it be  detected 
operating abnormally  in relation  to  flight  or mission plan.  The  FTS  provides  both  these 
abilities, and is described more fully in Section V.  
Operations  on  Range  for  cruise  missiles  are  conducted  according  to  the  pre-planned 
mission.  When  on-range, the missile's route is pre-planned  to meet range restrictions.  In 
planning  each mission, buffer lines  (also known  as  termination lines)  define  the areas  on 
ranges  or along  planned route  structure  that the  missile  will not be  allowed to  penetrate.  
At the  Utah Range  a line  2 nautical  miles  inside any  Warning Area,  Restricted  Area,  or 
Military  Operating  Area (MOA) boundary  are enforced.  In  our situation,  it is legal  to 
fly a missile in Sevier B MOA West of a line 2 nautical  miles inside the eastern  Sevier B 
MOA boundary,  however this is no longer done due to the increasing  manned presence in 
the  area  of the  proposed  storage  facility2°.  There  are  17  "no  fly"  areas  in  the  Skull 
Valley. Cruise missile flights are prohibited over these areas.  As such the  test conductors 
at  the  49h  TESTS  Squadron  have  elected  to  avoid  the  entire  Skull  Valley  for  cruise 
missile testing.  
A  standard, commonly  flown  cruise  missile route is depicted  in figures  14  and  15.  It is 
split in to a north range half and a south range half due to sizing restrictions.  The closest 
point  of  cruise  missile  approach  to  the  PFSF  site  on  this  route  is  approximately  10 
nautical  miles  (11.3  statute miles).  The majority of the route as we  can see  is well to the 
west  and south and north of the site.  
20 Interview  with Mr. Boe Hadley, the UTTR Range Control Officer
- PAGE  - 26-Figure  14: North Range Cruise Missile Routing
Figure  15:  South Range Cruise Missile Routing
- PAGE  * 27-The  closest  point of the  route to  the  PFSF  occurs  as  the  missile  starts  it  run-in  to  the 
target areas.  
Target  areas are well  defined  in UTTR, with TS-1,  TS-2,  TS-3, and TS-4 the targets used 
for cruise missile testing (see Figure 5).  
SUMMARY 
Test  operations  are  carefully  planned  and  controlled  throughout  their  duration.  With 
painstaking  procedures  utilized  to  plan  the  mission  and  with  continuous  monitoring 
throughout  the  flight,  each  missile  is  under  scrutiny of many  "eyes"  to  ensure  that it is 
performing  according  to  plan.  If  any  deviation  is  detected  from  the  planned  mission, 
control  of the missile is "taken" by the chase or monitoring crews,  and the missile  flown 
to the contingency recovery point.
* PAGE  * 28-V:  FLIGHT TERMINATION  SYSTEMS  (FTS) AND  PROCEDURES
FTS REQUIREMENTS 
Large  footprint  weapons  (cruise  missiles)  with  the  capability  to  exceed  UTTR  land 
boundaries or endanger range assets,  manned  sites and sensitive  areas must have  an FFS 
designed,  tested,  documented  and  certified  in  accordance  with  Range  Commander's 
Council  (RCC)  Standard  319-92  or  latest  revision.  Compliance  with  this  standard 
ensures that the FTS is compatible  with the range systems and procedures.  
The  Range  Commanders  Council  Document  319-99  also  dictates  F['S  performance 
requirements  for  all  FTSs  on  cruise  missiles.  This  750-page  document  details  every 
aspect pertaining  to Flight Termination  Systems.  Chapter  Four details  requirements  for 
remotely  piloted  vehicles  and cruise  missiles,  with 75-pages  devoted  to  these  vehicles.  
The  standards  are  rigorous  and  redundant.  There  is  no  more  thoroughly  scrutinized 
21 
subsystem on the cruise missile.  
Under RCC Document 319-99,  all FTSs used  on cruise missiles  on  the UTTR  (and other 
ranges)  are  designed  and  built  to  common  performance  specifications,  with  identical 
reliability  and  certification  requirements.  Specifically,  all  FTSs  must  be  99.9  percent 
22  reliable  at a  95 percent  confidence level.  The  designs  of FTSs  on different  models  of 
cruise missile  may vary  (e.g.,  ALCM employs  a parachute  as an  integral part of its  FT-S, 
while  Tomahawk  and  ACM  do  not),  but  all  FTSs  must  meet  the  same  performance 
standards.  
A typical  FTS  designed  and  developed  for the  Tomahawk  cruise  missile  is described  in 
Reference J.  
FTS APPROVAL / CERTIFICATION 
The FTS must be approved  for use on the range where it will be employed. Configuration 
approval is granted only after acceptance  of the FTS report and successful  demonstration 
of the complete system.  The Range Squadron Safety Office participates  in the  design and 
development  of  any  FTS  which  may  eventually  be  used  on  the  UTTR,  to  ensure 
compliance  with  RCC  Standard  319-92,  or  the  acceptance  of any  deviation  from  this 
standard.  Systems  approved  for use on one program  are not automatically  authorized  on 
another program.  Any  changes or modification  to approved  system, components  or test 
procedures are reviewed by Range Safety Squadron, and a re-certification process  may be 
necessary if substantive changes  are contemplated.  
During FTS  system design, provisions  are  incorporated  for the  display  of the following 
real-time telemetry and Time, Space, Position, Indicators  (TSPI) parameters  so the  Range 
Safety Officer (RSO) can monitor the missile during flight: 
21  Range Commanders  Council Document  319-99 Flight Termination Systems Commonality 
Standard Ch 4 
22  Id., para 4.4.17.
- PAGE  - 29-"*  TSPI  from  a  source  independent  of  vehicle  telemetry  (two  sources  highly 
recommended).  
"•  Test vehicle altitude, attitude and heading 
"*  Radio Frequency signal strength at both FFS receivers 
"*  Energy level  (voltage) of primary  and backup power supplies  used to power  the  FTS 
receivers, sequencers,  and termination mechanism 
"*  Status of all safe-and-arm  devices, lanyards, wing switches, etc.  
"*  Status of all FTS tone logic signals, e.g. MONITOR,  ARM, TERMINATE 
"*  Temperature of temperature  critical components  such as batteries and receivers 
"*  Fail-safe timer status 
"*  Any other FTS parameters  deemed necessary by the Range Safety Officer.  
FTS PROCEDURES  AND OPERATIONS 
There are two key modes of terminating  a cruise missile's flight using the FTS: 
(1)  By  command  from  the  range  when  the  missile  is detected  operating  improperly, 
such as deviating from plan, or if a range safety conditions requires  terminating the 
flight.  Safety officers  can  activate the  FTS at any time.  The Range Safety Officer 
at  Mission  Control  and  the  Airborne  Range  Instrumentation  Aircraft  are  both 
capable of terminating the cruise missile flight almost instantly.  
(2)  Loss of the constant carrier  signal required  to be received from  the range or one  of 
the  supporting  aircraft.  At all  times throughout the  flight  the  cruise  missile  FTS 
must detect a signal  that in effect permits the continued  flight of the missile.  If the 
missile does  not detect the signal  for a preset time,  the Fl'S  activates,  causing the 
missile to tumble and crash.  This arrangement is functionally equivalent to a dead
man  switch.  This accommodates  a missile-losing  signal (more importantly  loss  of 
telemetry  feedback  for  monitoring  the  missile's  health  and  status)  should  the 
missile reach  a  "shadow"  zone in  the  flight. By manually  terminating  the  carrier 
signal, the flight can be terminated in this manner as a secondary means.  
In addition to providing flight termination means, the FTS  also provides  override 
capabilities to the range and support aircraft to redirect the missile's flight path should 
that be required. Override control is employed,  for example, to remain clear of clouds,  to 
redirect a missile if an anomaly is detected in flight (visually or through telemetry), or in 
the event the missile needs to be steered clear of unanticipated encroaching aircraft.  
Before  execution  of the mission  and early  in flight,  the  FTS override  system is tested  in 
flight.  Before  a  launch  platform  (bomber) launches  a  test  cruise  missile,  the  Mission 
Control  Center  (MCC) verifies  that the missile's Remote  Command  and  Control  (RCC) 
and  Flight Termination  System  (FTS)  are  working properly.  Once  launched,  the  missile 
override  controls  are  quickly  checked  to  ensure  that  positive  control  of the  missile  is
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measurements  that confirm it is receiving the authorizing signal  (and  the strength  of that 
signal)  to  Mission  Control  via  the  telemetry  stream,  as  well  as  critical  operating 
parameters  for the ground crew to monitor missile health and status.  
RCC signals  originate from the command and control panel of the aircraft  monitoring the 
test  missile  in  flight.  These  signals  are  received  and  decoded  by  the  missile's  range 
safety equipment and are transmitted  to the missile guidance  set which computes  control 
signals for the  engine and  fins.  Range  safety  commands  are  divided into three  groups: 
manual  control,  on  track  control  and  emergency  control.  Manual  control  gives  range 
safety personnel all  axis control  of the  air vehicle.  With  on-track  control  the  air vehicle 
can be commanded  to climb, hold altitude,  or descend  on the planned track.  Emergency 
control  allows either commanded  or loss of power termination.  There are two methods  of 
terminating  air  vehicle  flight  as  described  above.  When  flight  terminate  signals  are 
received by the unit, the  decoder and guidance  set are bypassed and terminate signals  go 
directly  to  the  engine  and  fins.  The  terminal  maneuver  consists  of the  horizontal  fins 
being commanded  to null, the vertical fin is commanded to full leading edge right and the 
throttle is commanded to off.  
COMMAND  AND CONTROL DURING TESTING 
The  missile relays  all  instructions  its remote control  system receives  at the  same  time it 
carries  out  those  instructions.  Mission  Control  at  Hill  AFB  and  the  Airborne  Range 
Instrumentation  Aircraft  (ARIA)  monitor  these  signals  throughout  the  missile's  flight.  
The  missile remote  control  system permits  steering  the  cruise  missile  to  avoid  weather 
and  hazards,  and allows  manual  intervention  in case  of missile  malfunctions.  Mission 
Control  at  Hill  AFB  and  the  ARIA  can  take  manual  control  of the  missile.  Range 
transmitters  can  relay  any commands  from Mission  Control.  These  transmitters  are  on 
high  terrain but  they do not provide  continuous  line of sight communication  to missiles 
flying at low altitudes.  The  preferred  control platform  is the  ARIA aircraft,  because  its 
signals  are  less  likely  to  be  blocked  by terrain.  Soon  after  the  missile  is launched  on 
every  test,  ARIA  takes  manual  control  of the  missile  to  check  its  response.  Because 
ARIA  cannot  see  the  missile  it  works  with  chase  aircraft  to  check  the  missile's 
performance.  
Fighters  "chase"  (fly  in  company  and  visually  in  contact  with  the  missile)  the  missile 
throughout  its entire flight to ensure safety.  They remain behind  the missile, monitoring 
its  performance  and  heading.  If the  missile  is  tracking  toward  a  cloud,  or  if another 
aircraft  enters  the  range,  or  any  other  problem  exists,  the  chase  pilot  tells  the  ARIA 
controllers  how  and where  to steer the  missile to keep  its safe.  Two  fighters  are always 
"on  the missile" while the  other two fighters are refueling from the tanker.  Chase aircraft 
follow the missile until it completes its mission.
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HISTORY 
There have  been  12 documented cruise missile crashes  at the UTTR  in the  last 10 years, 
as  shown  in  Table  1.23  Seven were  Air Launched  Cruise Missiles  (ALCM  or CALCM, 
AGM  186B  and  AGM186C),  and  four  were  Advanced  Cruise  Missiles  (ACM,  AGM 
129)  (one was of unknown type).24  Twelve ALCM/ACM  cruise missile crashes  occurred 
in approximately  80  flights  during this  timeframe,  a  failure  (crash)  rate of  15%.  As  of 
1998,  197  Tomahawk  tests  had  been  conducted.  In  that  population,  four  (4)  missiles 
failed during the  cruise phase  and crashed on  non-military  land along the planned  flight 
path. There have be no failures during the cruise phase  in the last 52 of those  197 flights.  
Based on these data, there should be less than two- percent chance of cruise phase failure 
for Tomahawk cruise missiles, if Tomahawk testing was resumed at the UTTR.  
The  UTTR  crash  sites  are  listed  in  Table  1.  None  of the  vehicles  crashed  within  10 
nautical  miles  (nm) of the proposed  ISFSI site.  The closest crash  site is  13  miles  to the 
southwest.  Another  crashed  18  miles  from  the PFSF  site  and the  remainder  impacted 
more  than  30  miles  from  the  site,  with  the  most  distant  90  miles  to  the  southwest.  
Assuming  a  nominal  missile  groundspeed  of  420  knots,  (all  of  the  aforementioned 
vehicles  are subsonic), the nearest cruise  missile was  almost  2 minutes  flying time from 
the  site.  This  is  a  long  time  considering  that  the  FTS  can  be  activated  nearly 
instantaneously.  All of the  crashes  over the past  ten  years  have  occurred  on  or  within 
half  a mile laterally  of the  planned  route  (10  seconds  of flight  time).2 5 There  has  never 
been a cruise missile FTS failure at the UTTR.  See Reference  U.  
Current  plans  call  for  approximately  six cruise  missile  tests  annually.  These  tests  are 
Follow  On  Test and Evaluation launches  conducted  by the  Air Combat Command's 49' 
Test Squadron.  Basically these tests confirm the continuing  viability of stockpile missiles 
that already exist  in the USAF inventory.  The flight characteristics  of these missiles  are 
well  documented.  Both  the  Advanced  Cruise  Missile  (ACM)  and  the  Air  Launched 
Cruise  Missile  (ALCM)  have  been  in  the  active  inventory  since  the  early  1990's.  
Tomahawk  sea  launched  cruise missiles have  been  tested  at UTTR  in the  past, with  the 
last test there occurring in January  1988, but no flights are now scheduled  for UTTR.  
RANGE SAFETY 
Cruise  missiles  and  other  unmanned  systems  are  required  to  have  profiles  developed/ 
provided  which  avoid  manned/inhabited  locations.  For  vehicles  with  a range  approved 
flight  termination  system  on  UTTR,  manned  locations  shall  be  avoided  by a  horizontal 
distance equal to the AGL  altitude or 3 NM  above  18,000  ft AGL,  1 NM below  6,000 ft 
23  A  "crash"  is defined  as a missile impacting  the ground at an unintended point.  
24 Response to Freedom of Information Request from Hill AFB, UT Public Affairs page 1 
25 The planned route is the intended path  of the missile in flight over the range and crashes have been 
within half a mile of that route laterally.
- PAGE  - 32,AGL.26  According  to  Mr.  Boe  Hadley  of the  UTTR  Range  Control  Squadron  at  Hill
AFB,  UT,  cruise  missile  routing  includes  a 
UTTR airspace  boundary (see Reference  T).
3-mile  standard  buffer  distance  from  any
Table 1 UTTR Cruise Missile Crashes  From 1991  to 2000
Missile  Live  Crash  Crash Location  On/Off 
T  eyp  Warhead?  Date  DoD Land 
ALCM  No  24 Jul 91  155 degrees at  10  On 
miles from ENV 
VORTAC 
ALCM  No  8 Oct 91  Near Highway 6 in  Off 
Millard County 
ACM  Yes  16  Dec  92  SW of Granite  On 
Peak 
ALCM  No  20  Apr 93  -10  miles SW of  On 
Granite Peak 
CALCM  Yes  23  Jul 93  -20  miles W-SW  On 
of Wildcat 
CALCM  Yes  29  Mar 94  -20  miles SW of  Off 
Granite Peak 
ALCM  No  14 Sep 95  SW of Granite  On 
Peak 
ACM  No  24 Jun 96  Sevier Dry Lake  Off 
ACM  No  10 Dec  97  SW Bench  of  On 
Cedar  Mt 
CALCM  Yes  9 Jun 98  -1/2  mile NW  of  On 
TS-2A 
ACM  No  23  Mar 00  Near lbapah. NV  Off 
unknown  No  27  Sep  00  -50  mi. S of  Off 
Wendover, NV 
The  US  Air  Force  and  US  Navy  have  published  Trajectories  from  Flight  Termination 
27  profiles.  For example,  in  a worst  case  scenario for the ALCM  (at 40,000 ft AGL),  the 
missile travels  no  further  than  4.5  nm  after  the  terminate  signal  is  given,  as  shown  in 
Figure  16A and  16B below.  At 5,000  ft  AGL (where  the  missile  typically  cruises),  the 
ALCM travels a maximum of 1.6 nm along track and 0.4 nm laterally  (i.e., perpendicular 
to  the flight path).  The distances  in Figure  16 A  conservatively  assume  a 50-knot  wind 
28  blowing in the most disadvantageous  direction.  
26  AFI 13-212 UTTR Supplement  I (TEST) page  10 para 2.9.2 
2'7  E2., Tomahawk  Sea Launched Cruise Missile System Flight Termination System Report, pages 2-13 
through 2-16; Boeing Technical Data for AGM-86 Missile page 92, Figs. 3.1-3,  3.1-4.  
28  As they are designed  to common performance  specifications under RCC Document 319-99, the FTSs on 
Tomahawk,  ALCM, and  ACM all exhibit similar performance.  For example, the FTS  for the Tomahawk is 
designed  such that in the worst case the missile falls to the ground less than 2 nm along the missile flight 
path.  Tomahawk  Sea Launched  Cruise Missile System Flight Termination System Report page 2-13.  The 
length of the missile impact area (along flight path) is roughly 2.7 times  greater than the total width; thus 
the Tomahawk  missile can be expected to fall within 0.4 nm laterally  of the flight path.  Tomahawk  Flight 
Test  Operations  on the West Coast of the United States, Final Environmental Assessment (Oct.  1998)  page 
2-19.
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As  described  in  the  preceding  sections  of  this  report,  there  is  a  comprehensive  and 
controlled  process  in  place  the  governs  testing  of cruise  missiles  on the  Utah  Test  and 
Training Range,  all  of which are  to ensure  tests are  safe and  avoid potential  damage  to 
people,  facilities or structures.  In summary: 
(1)  Cruise  Missile  Tests  are  methodically  planned  events  with  safety  as  a primary 
consideration  throughout the process.  
(2)  Formal approval reviews  are conducted prior to the execution of each test to ensure 
thoroughness of all mission and contingency plans.  
(3)  All  test cruise  missiles are  fitted with a Flight Termination  System  (FTS)  capable 
of being  used to take manual control of a missile when  needed to redirect  it, or to 
immediately  terminate its  flight should  that be  required.  No  FTS  failure has  ever 
occurred.  
(4)  All cruise missile test flights are conducted  with a number of supporting aircraft in 
company with the cruise missile to observe  its flight (eyeball  contact).  In addition, 
telemetry  is  continuously  monitored  by  airborne  and  ground  control  stations  to 
observe  all  operating  parameters  of  the  test  missile.  With  the  ability  to  detect 
incipient  problems,  these  monitoring  stations  are  able  to  take preventive  actions 
should such be warranted.  
(5)  Cruise  missiles  fly  pre-programmed  routes  with  high  navigation  accuracy.  In 
instances where cruise missiles have failed in flight, impact has been within  14  mile 
of the planned flight path, 
(6)  In  the  UTTR,  cruise  missile  flight paths  are  required  to  remain  clear  of manned 
facilities  (e.g. the PFSF) by 3 miles.  
(7)  At their closest point of approach to the PFSF, cruise missile  flight trajectories  are 
tangential  (as opposed  to radial)  to  the PFSF, coming no closer  than  10  nm from 
the facility.  
Conclusion 
The  processes  and  procedure  in place  ensure  that any  flight  failure  of a  cruise  missile 
under test on the  UTTR  is highly  unlikely to encroach  on the  ISFSI  site. The  separation 
geometry  and  FTS  activation  parameters will  ensure that any  failed  missile lands  within 
the UTTR controlled  airspace boundaries, clear of known manned sites.  
ASSESSMENT:  Extremely low risk to the ISFSI friom a cruise missile test on UTTR.
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Captive Carry: 
Captive Carry refers  to the time that a missile is attached to an aircraft, and can be for 
an entire  flight  or for a  partial  flight in preparation  for launch.  A  total captive  carry 
mission is one in which the  missile is purposely held on the  launch aircraft pylon  for 
the entire  test mission.  This  is typically done to  verify  the mission profile  sequence 
interface hardware  and  software.  Additionally, the missile mission computer  can be 
coupled  to the  mother ship's  autopilot  to  allow  the missile  navigation  set to  fly  the 
mission  profile  while  still  attached  to  and  directing  the  maneuvers  of  the  launch 
aircraft.  In  this  scenario no  launch  is ever attempted.  A  second definition  of captive 
can-y refers  to  that portion of the test mission in which the  missile  is attached  to  the 
launch  platform.  In  this  scenario,  a  missile launch  is  planned  and  as  such captive 
carry  refers  to  only  that  portion  of  the  test  mission  during  which  the  missile  is 
actually  mated  to  and  communicating  with  the  launch  aircraft.  The  captive  carry 
portion of the mission ends when the missile departs the pylon 
Restricted Areas: 
"*  An area (land, sea, or air) in which there are special restrictive  measures  employed  to 
prevent  or minimize  interference  between  friendly  forces  or  an  area  under  military 
jurisdiction in which special  security measures  are employed  to prevent unauthorized 
entry.  
"*  Airspace within which the  flight of aircraft, while not wholly prohibited, is  subject to 
restriction.  IFR of VFR  operations  in  the  area may be authorized  by the  controlling 
air traffic  control facility when it is not activated by the using agency.  
"*  An  area  that must contain  all  "Hazardous  Activity"  as  defined  by branch  of service 
for specific type of aircraft using the range.  
Military Operating Areas (MOAs): 
Special  use  airspace  allocated  to  the  military  to  separate/segregate  certain  military 
activities  from Instrument Flight Rules  (IFR)  traffic and to identify  for Visual  Flight 
Rules  (VFR)  traffic where these activities  are conducted.  
Special Use Airspace: 
Airspace  of defined  dimension  wherein  activities  must be  confined because  of their 
nature,  and/or wherein  limitations  may  be  imposed  upon  aircraft  operation  that  are 
not part of those activities.
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